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ABSTRACT 
The world is at a turning point, moving away from the Cold War nuclear legacy towards a future global 
nuclear enterprise; and this presents a transformational challenge for nuclear materials management. 
Achieving safety and security during this transition is complicated by the diversified spectrum of threat 
“players” that has greatly impacted nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and homeland security 
requirements.  Rogue states and non-state actors no longer need self-contained national nuclear 
expertise, materials, and equipment due to availability from various sources in the nuclear market, 
thereby reducing the time, effort and cost for acquiring a nuclear weapon (i.e., manifestations of 
latency).  The terrorist threat has changed the nature of military and national security requirements to 
protect these materials.  An Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management (IGNMM) approach 
would address the existing legacy nuclear materials and the evolution towards a nuclear energy future, 
while strengthening a regime to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. 
 
In this paper, some preliminary concepts and studies of IGNMM will be presented.  A systematic 
analysis of nuclear materials, activities, and controls can lead to a tractable, integrated global nuclear 
materials management architecture that can help remediate the past and manage the future.  A systems 
approach is best suited to achieve multi-dimensional and interdependent solutions, including 
comprehensive, end-to-end capabilities; coordinated diverse elements for enhanced functionality with 
economy; and translation of goals/objectives or standards into locally optimized solutions.  A risk-
informed basis is excellent for evaluating system alternatives and performances, and it is especially 
appropriate for the security arena.  Risk management strategies – such as defense-in-depth, diversity, 
and control quality – help to weave together various technologies and practices into a strong and robust 
security fabric.  Effective policy, science/technology, and intelligence elements are all crucial and must 
be harmonized.  It is envisioned that integrated solutions will include reducing and securing 
nuclear/radiological materials at their source; improved monitoring and tracking; and enhancing 
detection, interdiction, and response.  An active architecture, artfully combined of many synergistic 
elements, would support national actions and international collaboration in nuclear materials 
management, and it would help navigate a transition toward global nuclear sustainability. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The nuclear era is at a key transition point, moving from an initial 50 years dominated by the 
development of nuclear weapons and nuclear power, moderated by the bipolar Cold War dynamic, to 
today‘s emerging global nuclear enterprise seeking nuclear materials, equipment, and technology for 
peaceful purposes while containing the threat of proliferating weapons of mass destruction.  Regardless 
of the future of nuclear weapons or nuclear energy, managing the generation, flow, and use of nuclear 
materials is essential to international security and is a fundamental, compelling, and enduring mission.  
For more than a decade, existing programs have been working towards this goal.  To uphold the 
President’s nonproliferation and security objectives a global unified approach is needed.  In addition, it 
is essential if there is to be a safe, secure, and reliable future nuclear energy regime.   
 
An Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management (IGNMM) approach would address the existing 
legacy nuclear and radiological materials and the transition towards a nuclear energy future while 
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 strengthening a regime to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation.  Achieving safety and security during 
this transition is complicated by the diversified spectrum of threat “players” that has greatly impacted 
nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and homeland security requirements.  Rogue states and non-state 
actors no longer need self-contained national nuclear expertise, materials, and equipment due to 
availability from various sources in the nuclear market, thereby reducing the time, effort and cost to 
acquiring a nuclear weapon (i.e. manifestations of latency).  In addition, the worldwide expanding 
peaceful use of radioactivity has left more radiological materials at risk.  The terrorist threat has 
changed the nature of military and national security requirements to protect these materials.  Countries 
cannot create impenetrable borders, so an integrated defense-in-depth approach to securing material 
worldwide is essential.  
 
Scope and Situation Analysis 
Integrating systems and situational analysis provide the important functions in building a progressive 
architecture for defining the problem domain, reconciling its boundary conditions and contingencies, 
and identifying the key technical and institutional factors and functions.  These then can be translated 
into requirements, components, and attributes of a system or framework approach to IGNMM that 
serves current needs and supports a pro-active approach to shortcomings and future demands.  The first 
step in designing the path forward would be to compile existing information on the inventory of 
worldwide nuclear materials and activities and the control functions exercised over them (e.g., 
monitoring and proliferation detection) into a representation of the global nuclear material management 
landscape.  This would include materials and activity pathways; their links to proliferation, latency, 
military threats, and/or terrorism and hence classes of risks associated with material and technology 
capabilities; and security or disposition strategic maps.  Today’s GIS software can greatly enhance the 
working link between databases, assessments and visualization.   
 
In parallel, an overall compilation and analysis of current USG and international nuclear 
nonproliferation and arms control regimes, as embodied in the complex of multi-party agreements, 
treaties, agreements, and standards, would be conducted.  Material control and accounting, physical 
protection, pledged material dispositions, expansion of nuclear energy, continued/future deployment of 
enrichment and reprocessing technology, expanded radioactive and by-product material use, and waste 
disposal will be among the key programs linked in one overall framework.   
 
The desired outcome is to identify strengths and any new priorities in the current nuclear materials 
management regime, in order to help reduce uncertainties and increase latency times.  Examples of 
application areas that might be distilled from this situation analysis include the future of plutonium, 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste disposition, and nuclear security.  Most of the world’s 
plutonium is in the geometrically expanding spent nuclear fuel, not in legacy nuclear weapon stockpiles, 
with limited, security-challenged disposition options of disposal, re-use, or transmutation.  Within the 
context of IGNMM and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the issues of safe storage, reprocessing, 
and disposal would be addressed.  
 
System or Framework Approach 
IGNMM can be made coherent and functional by an operational architecture.  The basic system 
approach depends on constant iteration and appropriate feedback among three key operations: 1) 
detection, measurement/monitoring, understanding, and bounding of situations; 2) assessing the risk 
landscape associated with an issue including its connection to other management issues or aspects; and 
3) developing system strategies for present and future actions and investments.  These three elements 
would work together to connect global objectives and principles to guide international, national and/or 
local implementation of solution strategies. 
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In addition to situation awareness, bounding the issue entails a geographic, political, and conceptual 
articulation of the desired results, operational constraints, and other considerations in view of U.S. and 
international program and agreements to control risks, while accommodating legitimate uses of nuclear 
materials.  It would include a realistic assessment of available management options, resources, and 
influences, taking into account the range of tolerable risks to enable evaluation of priorities and 
tradeoffs (e.g., cost-benefit) among options.  The risk-based assessment would include: 
• threat and vulnerability assessment and potential remediation;  
• determination of potential consequences of likely or hypothetical actions; and 
• communication and representation of the risk landscape to other analysts and decision makers.  
 
It is envisioned that integrated solutions will include reducing and securing nuclear/radiological 
materials at their source, monitoring and tracking (in-place or during transportation), and enhancing 
detection, interdiction, and response.  Such strategies and capabilities can also be assimilated to provide 
an operational system for warning and incident characterization in a near-real-time environment to 
achieve situational awareness and decision support.  An active architecture, artfully combined of 
detection, system models, methods, technologies, and international cooperation will allow the testing, 
discovery, and performance monitoring of robust and evolving strategies through measures to indicate 
degrees of success and to attribute credit to a strategy.  
 
This assessment characterizes and categorizes risks to support a graded approach to risk reduction and 
continuous improvement, and it is especially well suited to informing the control of undesired material 
use while permitting (with appropriate controls) desirable use.  Risk management options are 
formulated through a coherent mix of barriers, controls and actions such as detection, monitoring, 
prevention, protection, mitigation and response.  This is important for including an uncertainty 
reduction loop in the system feedback process, as well as pointing to additional program, science, 
assessment, and technology needs.  Insights from the risk analysis feedback to enhance and refine the 
understanding of the global nuclear material management problem, and they feed forward to solution 
development.  
 
In sum, an overall system framework feature would a three-pronged approach to nuclear material 
security, safety, and reliability:  
• Defense-in-depth entails barriers in different material management domains to realization of the 
same threat (for example, securing, tracking, and interdicting a material. 
• Diversity in a multiplicity of protection approaches, such as technological controls, institutional 
controls, and cooperation for building global and regional security. 
• Control quality relates to the design, implementation, and operation of controls or disincentives 
such as safeguards and security, standards, and treaty requirements.  It ensures controls work as 
intended and that best practices are implemented.  
 
By harmonizing a web of national and international assessments, activities, programs, and capabilities 
with the flexibility of local options and incorporating risk management strategies of defense-in-depth, 
diversity, and quality control, a path forward can be developed to help direct future programs, and can 
provide a basis for understanding and addressing nuclear weapon latency.  A risk-informed predictive 
knowledge framework can enable prioritizations and tradeoffs among local solution options to meet cost 
and other performance measures, and it would support national decision-making and effective 
international collaboration.  Such a framework commonly used among international partners will 
facilitate effective cooperation with foreign entities. The drivers are global but the solutions must be 
national and in many cases local. 
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